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Opinion Polling and Election Predictions
Robert Northcott*y
Election prediction by means of opinion polling is a rare empirical success story for social
science. I examine the details of a prominent case, drawing two lessons of more general
interest: (1) Methodology over metaphysics. Traditional metaphysical criteria were not a
useful guide to whether successful prediction would be possible; instead, the crucial thing
was selecting an effective methodology. (2) Which methodology? Success required so-
phisticated use of case-speciﬁc evidence from opinion polling. The pursuit of explana-
tions via general theory or causal mechanisms, by contrast, turned out to be precisely the
wrong path—contrary to much recent philosophy of social science.
1. Introduction: Metaphysics and Methodology. Is systematic predictive
success in social science possible? Many have given reasons why it is not,
such as the fact that social systems are open systems, or that they exhibit re-
ﬂexivity, or simply that there are too many variables needing to be modeled
(Taylor 1971; Giddens 1976; Hacking 1995; Lawson 1997). In this article I
examine a notable case of predictive success so far relatively neglected by
philosophers—namely, election prediction by means of opinion polling—that
seems to contradict these reasons.
Next, if successful prediction is possible, what makes that so? The lesson
from the opinion polling case is that the most fruitful answer to this question
is not metaphysical but rather methodological. In particular, success or the
lack of it was not predictable from the metaphysics of elections, which in-
deed in many respects remain unknown.1 Rather, what was crucial was
a certain methodological approach.
1. Strevens (2005), for instance, gives metaphysical conditions for when explanation
and prediction are possible in some complex systems. But it is unclear whether these
conditions are satisﬁed in the elections case.
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One popular methodological view, borne in part from pessimism about
the possibility of prediction, has argued that the main aim of social science
should instead be explanation. The latter can be achieved via the discovery
of causal mechanisms, as urged by ‘new mechanists’ (Lawson 1997; Brante
2001), or else via the development of underlying theory (Elster 1989; Little
1991). Moreover, much of mainstream practice in economics and other
social sciences is implicitly committed to the latter view: while all accept
that rational choice models, for instance, might not be predictively suc-
cessful, nevertheless they are held to provide ‘understanding’ or ‘underly-
ing explanation’.
A contrary view rejects this methodological emphasis on mechanisms
or underlying theory (Cartwright 2007; Reiss 2008). One strand, motivated
in part by detailed case studies of other empirical successes, has emphasized
instead context-speciﬁc and extratheoretical work. Theories and mechanisms
play at most a heuristic role; empirical success requires going beyond them
(Alexandrova 2008; Alexandrova and Northcott 2009).
The details of the opinion polling case turn out to endorse this second
view. The reason is that, roughly speaking, while the extratheoretical ap-
proach achieved prediction but not explanation, the theory-centered approach
achieved neither. That is, a search for explanation not only yielded no pre-
dictive success but also yielded no explanations. Hence, the ﬁrst view gives
exactly the wrong advice.
I focus on the 2012 US presidential election, in which Barack Obama de-
feated Mitt Romney. I begin by describing the predictive success achieved
by aggregators of opinion polls (sec. 2), before examining how this success
was achieved (secs. 3 and 4). In contrast, theoretical approaches to election
prediction fared much worse (sec. 5). I then discuss their failure also at fur-
nishing explanations (secs. 6 and 7).
2. Predictive Success and Metaphysical Criteria. The 2012 presidential
campaign featured literally thousands of opinion polls. The most successful
of all election predictors were some aggregators of these poll results. Fa-
mously, several correctly forecast the winner of all 51 states in the 2012
election, as well as also gettingObama’s national vote share correct to within
a few tenths of a percent.2 This was a stunning success, arguably with few
equals in social science. Nor was it easy—no one else replicated it, although
2. Four of the most successful aggregators were http://votamatic.org, http://www.huff
ingtonpost.com/news/pollster/, http://election.princeton.edu/, and http://ﬁvethirtyeight
.blogs.nytimes.com/. The forecasting models for the ﬁrst two of these were designed
mainly by political science academics, the third by a neuroscience academic, and the
last by a nonacademic. Three of the four got every state right.
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many tried.3 On the morning of the election, the bookmakers had Romney’s
odds at 9/2, that is, about 18%. Political futures markets such as InTrade
had Romney’s chances at about 28%. These market prices imply that com-
mon opinion was surprised by the outcome.4
Moreover, it is unreasonable to declare this success a mere ﬂuke. First,
the same poll aggregators have been successful in other elections too. And
within any one election there have been many separate successful predic-
tions, such as of individual Senate races or of margins of victory, which
are at least partially independent of each other. Second, the aggregators’
methods are independently persuasive. It therefore behooves philosophers
of social science to understand them.
Meanwhile, do elections satisfy the metaphysical criteria allegedly nec-
essary for predictive success? It seems not. Presidential elections are clearly
open systems in that they are not shut off from causal inﬂuences unmodeled
by political science. They undoubtedly feature many variables. And they are
clearly subject to reﬂexivity concerns: sometimes the mere publication of a
poll itself inﬂuences an eventual election result; indeed, there were several
examples of this during the 2012 campaign. Yet despite such troubles, highly
successful prediction proved possible nevertheless.
3. The Science of Opinion Polling. In any opinion poll, the voting inten-
tions of a sample serve as a proxy for those of a population.5 How might
things go wrong, such that the sample will not be representative? The most
well-known way, a staple of newscasts and introductory statistics courses
alike, is sampling error: small samples can lead to misleading ﬂukes. But
sampling error is not the only, or even the most important, source of in-
3. See http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2012/11/war-on-nate-silver-ﬁnal-after-action
-report-the-ﬂag-of-science-ﬂies-uncontested-over-silvergrad-weblogging.html for a list of
47 examples of failure, with an emphasis on their suspicion of polling-based prediction.
4. There is an issue here about exactly what we are predicting and, thus, how we measure
predictive success. After all, these market prices still had Obama as the favorite, so why
should we term them ‘surprised’ by his victory? In reply, ﬁrst, besides the simple fact of
the overall winner, there were also relevant additional facts: who won each state, and how
much they won them by. Oddsmakers were not impressive with respect to these more
detailed targets. Indeed, barring unlikely background assumptions, the details of the state-
level results are hard to reconcile with a 28% chance of overall Romney victory. Second,
the best poll aggregators’ predictions were probabilistic, which makes it quite an intricate
matter to assess who actually did best. (For analysis, see http://rationality.org/2012/11/09
/was-nate-silver-the-most-accurate-2012-election-pundit/.) But there is no serious dispute
that the oddsmakers and many other predictors were not accurate.
5. Although election prediction is the focus of this article, opinion polls, of course,
have many other uses too.
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accurate predictions.6 Awareness of this crucial point lies at the heart of any
serious election prediction.
To begin, a major issue for pollsters is to ensure that their samples are ap-
propriately balanced with respect to various demographic factors. Suppose,
for example, that two-thirds of interviewees were women. Since there was
good reason to think that women were disproportionately likely to vote for
Obama, it follows that such a woman-heavy sample would give misleadingly
pro-Obama predictions. Polling companies would therefore rebalance such
a sample, in effect putting greater weight on men’s responses. Notice several
things about such a rebalancing procedure.
First, it is quite different from sampling error.7 In particular, if our sam-
pling procedure overselects women, then this problem will not be alleviated
just by making the sample larger.
Second, sample rebalancing is clearly unavoidable if we wish to predict
accurately. For this reason, every polling company performs some version
of it.
Third, a poll’s headline ﬁgures are therefore heavily constructed. They are
certainly not the raw survey results. Exactly what and how much rebalanc-
ing is required depends on assumptions about the actual turnout on Election
Day. For instance, in recent American presidential elections typically there
have been slightly more women than men voters, so it would be a mistake
to rebalance the sample to exactly 50:50. The correct ﬁgure may not be
obvious, it needing to be inferred from imperfect polling data about past
elections, and moreover with some assessment of how patterns of turnout
may change again in the upcoming election. Accordingly, different polling
companies may reasonably choose slightly different rebalancing procedures.
The result is the phenomenon of ‘house effects’, when any particular com-
pany’s results may systematically favor one or other candidate compared to
the industry average. When assessing the signiﬁcance of a poll for election
prediction, it is vital to be aware of this.
Fourth, the rebalancing issue is pressing because it applies to many other
factors besides gender, such as age, income, race, likeliness to vote, educa-
tion, ownership of cell phones but not landlines, and home access to Inter-
net. Not only is the precise rebalancing procedure for each of these factors
6. For example, almost 25% even of late polls miss the ﬁnal election result by more than
their ofﬁcial conﬁdence interval (http://ﬁvethirtyeight.com/features/how-the-ﬁvethirty
eight-senate-forecast-model-works/ ), yet the expected miss rate given sampling error
alone should be only 5%.
7. Lying in the background here are reference class issues. But given the unavoidable
cognitive and epistemic constraints facing polling scientists, their choice of reference
class is not arbitrary. And in practice the distinction between sampling and systematic
error is of enormous importance.
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arguable, but it is also arguable exactly which factors should be rebalanced
for in the ﬁrst place (see below).
In addition to random sampling error and systematic sampling bias, there
are several other potential sources of error as well. There is space only to
mention a couple here. One is the phenomenon of herding: at the end of a
campaign, pollsters—it is widely suspected—‘herd’, that is, report headline
ﬁgures closer to the industry mean, presumably to avoid the risk of standing
out as having missed the ﬁnal result by an unusually large margin. Some
sensitivity to this turns out to be optimal for accurate election prediction.8
A second worry is simply that voters may change their minds between a poll
and Election Day. This is the main reason why polls taken, say, 6 months
before an election have a much poorer predictive record than those taken
later. Election predictions must therefore take into account a poll’s date too.
4. Poll Aggregation. Turn now to the aggregation of polls, which repre-
sents a second layer of method, quite distinct from that required to conduct a
single poll. Historically, poll aggregation has had a better predictive record
than using individual polls alone. One obvious reason is that aggregation
increases effective sample size and therefore reduces sampling error. A
typical individual poll may have 95% conﬁdence intervals of 3% or 4%;
those for an aggregation of 8–10 polls, by contrast, are typically 0.75% or
1%.9 But it is a different story for the other possible sources of error. Mere
aggregation is no cure for those, because they may bias all polls—and hence
the aggregate of polls—in a similar way.10
What, then, does account for aggregation’s superior predictive success?
In addition to the reduction of sampling error, sophisticated aggregation can
mitigate the other sources of error too. This explains why the best aggre-
gators beat simple averaging of the polls. It is instructive to consider a
couple of examples of methodological issues in more detail.
4.1. State versus National Polls. One feature of the 2012 US presi-
dential campaign was a divergence between state and national polls. By
combining opinion polls for individual states, making due allowance for
8. For evidence of herding’s signiﬁcance, as well as references, see http://ﬁvethirtyeight
.com/features/heres-proof-some-pollsters-are-putting-a-thumb-on-the-scale/, http://ﬁve
thirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/11/oct-10-is-romney-leading-right-now/, http://
votamatic.org/pollsters-may-be-herding/, and http://themonkeycage.org/2012/09/26
/robo-polls-a-thumb-on-the-scales/.
9. There were rarely more than 8 or 10 polls of a single area in a single time period.
10. Although house effects will, by deﬁnition, cancel out, still it might be that the best
sample rebalancing procedure is an outlier relative to the industry average.
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population and likely turnout, it is possible to calculate an implicit ﬁgure for
the vote share across the country as a whole. When this was done, there was
a surprising inconsistency: the state polls implied that Obama was ahead
at the national level, but the national-level polls showed him behind. The
divergence was at least 3 percentage points. What to do? Simple averaging
was no answer, because the inconsistency was equally true of the polls’
averages.
One possible cause of the divergence was that it was just sampling error—
conﬁdence intervals are sufﬁciently wide that there is a nonnegligible chance
of this. However, the discrepancy had persisted for much of the campaign,
rendering this explanation implausible. Another possibility was that Obama’s
votes were disproportionately concentrated in heavily polled swing states.
But this explanation turned out to be implausible too. First, it required dis-
proportionately good Romney polling in non-swing states, but this had not
occurred. Second, it seemed unlikely anyway given that, demographically
speaking, swing voters in Ohio or Virginia are much the same as those in
Texas or California, so why should their voting intentions be systematically
different? After all, both campaigns were spending similar amounts in the
swing states. Third, such a pattern is uncommon historically.
There therefore seemed little prospect of reconciliation; instead, it boiled
down to preferring one of the state or national polls to the other. In favor
of the national polls, they tend to have larger sample sizes and to be run by
more reputable ﬁrms. But on balance, there were better reasons to prefer
the state polls. First, there are many more of them, suggesting that sampling
error is less likely. Second, some of the other sources of error are arguably
less likely too. In particular, herding effects will likely occur relatively in-
dependently in different states. As a result, that source of error for state polls
will likely cancel out when inferring aggregate national polling numbers.
Third, we turn to historical evidence again: when the two have conﬂicted
in previous elections, typically the state polls have proven better predictors
than have national ones.
The takeaway is to emphasize the value added by sophisticated poll ag-
gregation. Simply averaging the polls was not enough. Neither was it optimal
just to split the difference between state and national polls symmetrically.
Instead, more sophisticated analysis was required.
4.2. Could All the Polls Have Been Wrong? By the end of the 2012
campaign, it was clear that if the polls were right, then Obama would win.
Romney’s only hope by then was that the polls were systematically skewed
against him. Thus, all turned onwhether the polls could indeed be so skewed.
Once again, simple averaging is no help here because the issue at hand is
not what the polls said but rather how strongly we should believe what they
said.
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The historical record suggested that it was unlikely that the polls were
skewed enough to save Romney.11 Conﬁdence in this conservative verdict
was strengthened by the absence in 2012 of factors that had marked sys-
tematic polling errors in the past, such as a high number of voters declaring
themselves ‘undecided’, or a signiﬁcant third-party candidate. Given that
it was the end of the campaign, there was also little reason to expect a large
change of voters’ minds before Election Day—especially given the record
levels of early voting. Finally, the number of polls involved and the size of
Obama’s lead also made sampling error an implausible savior for Romney.
The only remaining source of error was therefore sample rebalancing.
In particular, was there some procedural skew, common across many or all
polls, that had been mistakenly depressing Romney’s ﬁgures? There was
little evidence of a signiﬁcant ‘Bradley effect’, that is, where polls overrated
Obama because respondents were reluctant to state their opposition to him
for fear of seeming racist.12 But a different possibility was much discussed.
It concerned whether polling companies should rebalance samples accord-
ing to party afﬁliation. American voters self-identify as one of Democrat, Re-
publican, or Independent. If a polling sample were, say, disproportionately
composed of Democrats, that would yield a skewed pro-Obama result. In
2012, that was exactly the accusation: polls showed that Romney had a big
lead among Independents, and critics charged that Obama came out ahead
overall only because the polls were ‘oversampling’ Democrats. That is, the
proportion of Democrats in samples was charged to be disproportionately
high in light of exit polls from previous elections and other considerations.13
The key methodological issue is whether party afﬁliation is a stable pop-
ulation variable that should be adjusted for in the same manner as age or
gender, or whether instead it is an unstable variable that is merely an attitude
and often just an effect of voting preferences. If the latter, then the party
of whoever is the more popular candidate may be ‘oversampled’ simply
because a voter’s party self-identiﬁcation is inﬂuenced by their voting in-
tention in a way that their age or gender cannot be. If so, then it is distorting
to rebalance for stated party afﬁliation; but if not so, then it is distorting not
to. Standard industry practice had been the former, that is, not to rebalance
for stated party afﬁliation. Predicting correctlywhowouldwin the presidency
turned critically on whether this practice was correct. Was it?
Again, simply averaging the polls would not help. One piece of evidence
gives a ﬂavor of the more detailed kind of analysis required. Across dif-
11. See http://ﬁvethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/04/nov-3-romneys-reason-to
-play-for-pennsylvania/.
12. See http://www.ﬁvethirtyeight.com/2008/08/persistent-myth-of-bradley-effect.html.
13. See http://www.redstate.com/2012/10/26/why-i-think-obama-is-toast/.
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ferent polls of a particular state, with similar headline ﬁgures, there was
typically a strong positive correlation between Romney’s lead among In-
dependents and the proportion of voters self-identifying as Democrats.14
The inference from this is that party self-identiﬁcation is an unstable vari-
able. For various reasons, a given Obama voter might self-identify as In-
dependent in one poll but as Democrat in a second. As a result, in the ﬁrst
poll there are fewer Democrats and Romney’s lead among Independents is
lower, whereas in the second both are higher—hence the positive correla-
tion. Overall, the important thing from a prediction point of view is there-
fore whether Obama is leading overall in both polls—as, in swing states, he
indeed was.
5. Failure of the Theory-Centered Approach. The details of poll aggre-
gation show clearly the case-speciﬁc nature of its methods. The alternative
is to focus instead on ‘fundamentals’, that is, on variables that might shed
light on election results generally, not just case-speciﬁcally, such as eco-
nomic conditions, the perceived extremism of candidates, incumbency, and
so forth. There is a literature in political science on election prediction that
aims to furnish just such generalizable models.15 How does it fare?
Conveniently, it too has focused on US presidential elections. The
sample size is relatively small, as fewer than 20 elections have good enough
data. This creates a danger of overﬁtting. In response, models typically
feature only a small number of variables, most commonly economic ones
such as growth in gross domestic product (GDP), jobs, or real incomes.16
Sensibly, they are estimated on the basis of one part of the sample and then
tested by tracking their predictive performance with respect to the rest of the
sample.17 Even then, there remains a risk of overﬁtting—if a model pre-
14. See http://www.hufﬁngtonpost.com/nick-gourevitch/romney-lead-with-independents
_b_2058290.html.
15. Inﬂuential contributions include Fair (1978), Campbell and Wink (1990), Hibbs
(2000), Abramowitz (2008), and Lewis-Beck and Tien (2008). Montgomery, Hollenbach,
and Ward (2012) average these and other models to achieve the best forecasting success
of all.
16. Literally thousands of economic variables could plausibly be deemed relevant, not
to mention many noneconomic ones as well.
17. Of course, there is a long history of debate in philosophy of science about the rel-
ative epistemic merits of novel prediction versus retrospective accommodation of the
facts. Defenses of the latter typically emphasize how theory may have been developed
or tested independently of the particular accommodation, how background knowledge
may leave the main epistemic task to be mere calibration of an agreed functional form,
or how a lack of plausible alternative explanations tells in favor of the one that we
do ﬁnd. But none of these defenses apply well to the election prediction case, thus
justifying the literature’s concentration on prediction.
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dicted the ﬁrst few out-of-sample elections quite well, will its success
continue in future elections? Moreover, even if a model does successfully
predict past elections, there is no guarantee that the political environment is
so stable that the model will remain correct in the future too.
With these caveats noted, it is true that the models do have a little success.
On one estimate, the best ones’ average error when predicting the incumbent
party’s share of the vote is between 2% and 3%.18 But this is not quite as
impressive as it might sound. First, for our purposes it is something of a
cheat, in that one of the variables in by far the highest weighted model—
Abramowitz (2008)—is a polling result, namely, presidential approval rat-
ing. Hence, the success is not achieved purely by fundamentals. Second, a
2%–3% average error corresponds to an average error when estimating the
gap between the leading two candidates of about 5%. Third, vote shares
rarely deviate all that much from 50% anyway, so they are quite an easy
target—indeed, another estimate is that economic variables account for
only about 30%–40% of the variance in incumbent party vote share.19 Over-
all, the models do not predict individual election results very reliably. On
many occasions, they even get wrong the crude fact of which candidate
won. For accurate prediction, it is necessary to incorporate the results of
opinion polls.
6. Explanation. Why did Obama win? Answering this requires identiﬁ-
cation of his victory’s causes.20 That, in turn, requires a veriﬁed theory or
causal model. The problem is that nobody—from either approach—has
managed to produce one.
On the polling side, in a trivial sense Obama’s victory is ‘explained’ by
the fact that, as revealed by aggregators, on the eve of the election a majority
of the electorate were minded to vote for him. But, of course, for most
investigative purposes a deeper explanation is required, in particular one
that might apply to other elections too. Poll aggregation provides none.21
18. See http://www.brendan-nyhan.com/blog/2011/11/a-comparison-of-presidential
-forecasting-models.html for discussion and references.
19. See http://ﬁvethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/a-radical-centrist-view-on
-election-forecasting/.
20. Following the literature under consideration here, I focus on causal explanation. I
do not mean to rule out the possibility of other forms of explanation.
21. It is true that some proximate explanations of the election outcome can be tested by
careful observation of movements in the polls. For instance, the impact of Obama’s weak
performance in the ﬁrst presidential debate, or of Hurricane Sandy in the campaign’s ﬁnal
week, can be assessed in this way. But testing an explanation is not the same as providing
one.
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On the fundamentals side, if their models had fared better, they would
have provided the very explanations that polling aggregation does not.
After all, that is precisely the motivation for theory-centered methodology.
Thus, we might have been able to explain that Obama won because of, say,
positive GDP and jobs statistics in the preceding two quarters. Unfortu-
nately, though, the fundamentals models are not predictively accurate.
Can they nevertheless provide us with explanations anyway? The ar-
gument would be that they have truly identiﬁed relevant causes. It might be
postulated, for instance, that GDP or stock market growth does causally im-
pact voter preferences and thus election outcomes. True, other causes impact
too, and so the models do not explain the outcomes fully or predict them
accurately, but that still leaves room for the claim that they explain them
‘partially’ by correctly identifying some of the causes present.22
But, alas, even this claim is dubious. First, the different models cite dif-
ferent variables. Abramowitz’s, for instance, cites GDP growth, presidential
approval rating, and a complex treatment of incumbency; Hibbs’s, however,
cites growth in real disposable income and the number of military fatalities
abroad. Even among economic variables alone, somemodels cite GDP, some
household incomes, some jobs data, some stock market performance, and
so on. There are many different ways to achieve roughly the same limited
predictive success, which shakes our faith that any one way has isolated the
true causal drivers of election results. Perhaps the small sample size relative
to the number of plausible variables makes this problem insoluble.
A second reason for pessimism is that, elsewhere in science, a standard
response to predictive failure is to test putative causes in isolation. As it
were, at least we achieve predictive success in the isolated test. Unfortu-
nately, such experiments are impossible in the case of election predictions.
So in addition to predictive failure at the level of elections as a whole, the
causal factors picked out by the models have not earned their empirical
keep by other means either.
The upshot is that we have no warrant for asserting that we have found
even some of the causes of election outcomes, and therefore no warrant for
claiming even partial explanations. Thus, the basic conclusion stands: we
have not achieved any explanation of election outcomes, and so the original
motivation for turning to fundamentals models is frustrated.
7. Transportability. Are the predictive successes of one election transfer-
rable to another? That is, will a similar polling aggregation strategy work
elsewhere? For US presidential elections, it seems that the answer is “yes”—
witness the success of many of the same polling aggregators in 2008. How-
22. See Northcott (2013) for more on the relevant sense of partial explanation.
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ever, it is a different story for other elections, such as US congressional elec-
tions or elections in other countries.23
The reason is precisely the case-speciﬁc nature of polling aggregation—
for the best aggregation does not rely only on polls. It must also factor in
features such as whether an election is a single national vote or split into
many smaller constituencies, whether there are two or many major political
parties, whether the voting system is ﬁrst-past-the-post or proportional rep-
resentation, one-shot or multi-round, and so on. The implications of a poll
for election prediction depend on just such factors. It has also proved pre-
dictively proﬁtable to moderate polling results by considering what result
should be ‘expected’, given various local demographic and historical fac-
tors. The details of just how to do this are important—and inevitably highly
case speciﬁc.
Perhaps even more signiﬁcantly, the earlier nuances, namely, adjudi-
cating state versus national polls and whether polls might be systematically
skewed, could also only be resolved by case-speciﬁc knowledge. There are
many similar examples, such as the extent of regression to the mean to be
expected after ‘bumps’ from party conventions or presidential debates, or if
one candidate is ‘surprisingly’ far ahead at an early stage of the campaign.
Such knowledge is crucial, but typically it is transferrable to new elections
only imperfectly if at all.
So a serious polling aggregator must build a new election prediction
model each time. This lack of transportability is really just the ﬂip side of
two facts familiar from above: ﬁrst, that no one has achieved satisfactory
causal explanations, not even the poll aggregators; and second, that pre-
dictive success requires case-speciﬁc knowledge rather than a search for
generalizable causal mechanisms or theoretical underpinnings.
8. Conclusion. How can we make progress, that is, predict election results
even better? It is clear that improving the models of fundamentals is an un-
promising route. Rather, progress will be made in the sameway as it has been
made in the past few years—by doing polling aggregation better. This might
involve getting better polling data, analyzing that data better, or understand-
ing better how the implications of that data depend on local peculiarities—in
other words, by developing the case-speciﬁc, extratheoretical components
of prediction for each application anew. Although transportable explana-
tions are elusive, predictive success need not be. What is clear, though, is
that context-free general theory offers neither: it seems that there are no
shortcuts in social science.
23. The http://ﬁvethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/ predictions of the 2010 US congres-
sional and UK parliamentary elections, for instance, were notably less successful.
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